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Houthi thought represents a mixture of revivalist Zaydi Shi’ism which, prior to the civil war, had been under pressure from Sunni Muslim proselytizers. Many observers have forgotten that the Houthi movement is, at its core, fueled by ideology. These three observations aside, ideology has played an outsized role in the Houthis’ decision to let the ceasefire expire. If Yemen cannot be held together, the Houthi logic goes, there is little point in negotiating for a long-term political solution instead, it would be better to maintain control over the north in preparation for a de facto partition of the country. The Houthis fully grasp the divisions between the STC and the other members of the PLC, and those tensions have undoubtedly influenced Houthis positions at the negotiating table. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which maintains a representative in the Presidential Leadership Council, has long advocated for a separate state in southern Yemen and has a powerful outside patron in the United Arab Emirates. Third, it is not clear that Yemen as a country can be held together. The group still controls much of northern Yemen any political solution would mean giving up this control in exchange for an uncertain payoff, which Houthi leaders are loath to do. The Houthis may have concluded that a political settlement with the PLC would provide them with less power than they currently enjoy. Although the public is not privy to the details of such talks, presumably they entail some type of power-sharing arrangement between the Houthis and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) that now governs the internationally recognized Yemeni government. In this case, the temporary truce that began on Apwas intended to lead to negotiations for an ultimate political solution to the Yemen crisis, which has caused tens of thousands of deaths from violence and from malnutrition and disease alone.īoth the United Nations and Oman, which have taken mediation roles in the conflict, have reportedly used their offices to broker an enduring settlement, but with little success. Second, ceasefires are by their very nature temporary and contingent on the interests of the parties that agree to them. On the other hand, other elements of the Houthi leadership may have concluded that the movement still has the upper hand militarily, meaning that a return to war could either allow them to win outright or to strengthen their position ahead of future negotiations. Certainly, Yemeni civilians, including those living under Houthi control, have gained a reprieve from the destructive violence of the civil war, and this may have influenced the group’s agreement to suspend the war for six months. The first factor to consider is that the leadership of the Houthis may be divided on the benefits of a ceasefire with Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

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In a news conference on October 5, Lenderking noted the Yemeni government’s inability to meet a series of last-minute “maximalist” Houthi demands, including a request that the Yemeni government pay the salaries of civil servants within Houthi territory-a demand that the envoy described as “entirely unreasonable,” adding that “some Houthi leaders understand this.” If this is the case, why are the Houthis attempting to disrupt the ceasefire negotiations?

Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking has placed the blame squarely on the Houthi rebels.

Frustrated by the failure of Yemen’s warring factions to extend the ceasefire on October 1, thereby allowing the country’s eight-year conflict to resume, U.S.

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